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This paper highlights how the National Socialist regime in Germany created the so-called 
«Selbstschutz» («self protection») in civil air defense as an «apparatus of society» (Michel 
Foucault) to educate the German population with regard to the new possibility of aerial 
bombing. Mechanisms, functions of emotional control and their relationship to concrete prac-
tices of the people involved are shown alongside a local example. Regarding the spread and 
development of fears, this article maintains that practices of «Selbstschutz» had to bridge the 
temporal gap between future expectations and actual experiences in crucial ways. Before the 
war, «Selbstschutz» followed its own logic of expectation of danger and risk, as exemplified 
in aerial-defense simulation exercises, which clashed with the reality of bombs falling on 
German cities later on.
Fear and Air War
The basic emotion of fear and anxiety1 may very well be considered a 
* The author would like to thank Julia Engelschalt (Bielefeld University) for her tran-
slation of this article.
1 Fear and anxiety are frequently used together. Since the German term «Angst» is 
the one most used in my sources, I will focus on fear, which I understand here as the 
anticipation of an undesirable event which is believed to happen in the future.
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ubiquitous phenomenon of human existence [Ben-Ze’ev 2000, 474-
489]. However, fear is not merely an anthropological constant guiding 
human action according to a simple stimulus-response model. Two 
basic assumptions underwrite historiographical accounts of fear: first 
and foremost, fear is always and inevitably historical, meaning that its 
social and cultural conditions, functions and effects change across time 
and space. Secondly, fear was and continues to be an emotion of great 
historical impact as well as the origin of both reflections and negotia-
tions [Hitzer 2011; Bourke 2005]2.
Especially in modern mass societies of the belligerent «age of extremes» 
(Eric Hobsbawm), both individual and collective fears played an im-
portant role in political contexts. Fear increasingly became the object 
of governmental efforts. In German history, the taboo of public nego-
tiation or reflection of this emotion was not removed until very recen-
tly. It was not until the second half of the 1950s and the beginning of 
the anti-nuclear movement that fear became an explicit part of public 
discourse and even came to serve as a justification for political claims. 
Throughout the «Third Reich» and during the early years of the Fede-
ral Republic, this emotion had been stigmatized or even pathologized 
[Biess 2009, 242f.]. That notwithstanding, of course, fears always exi-
sted and were crucial to emotional regimes in modern states.
Particularly during the age of air war and aerial bombing against Ger-
man cities in the Second World War, the collective fear present in civil 
society needed to be addressed by the National Socialist state. In the 
sense of Michel Foucault’s concept of «governmentality», the modern 
state was facing a fundamentally new problem with regard to the art of 
government3. In the context of air war, the government had to develop 
2 Following Martha Nussbaums classical definition, I here define emotions as «ap-
praisal or value judgment[s], which ascribe to things and persons outside the person’s 
own control great importance for that person’s flourishing» [Nussbaum 2001, 4].
3 «The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, 
the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex 
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new strategies both of protecting and producing its citizens. Beyond 
that, in contexts of security, the German case is specific in that the po-
litical pursuit of security, of «Ruhe und Ordnung» («quiet and order») 
played a central role in the political culture of modern Germany [Lin-
denberger 2001]. The beginning of World War I, and particularly the 
first aerial bombings, marked a moment of fundamental disturbance of 
this desire. At this point, and increasingly during the interwar period, 
the «homefront» – meaning civilians both at their workplaces and in 
their homes – became a veritable issue in military discourse [Süß 2011, 
27-30]. Therefore, in reaction to this new danger to society in general, 
new concepts of civil air defense were established and became a political 
field in their own right [Fritzsche 1992]. The governance of emotions 
– particularly, fear – constituted a key aspect in this context. Not only 
was the state no longer able simply to conceptualize its population as a 
passive entity under the guidance of state institutions; the regime also 
depended on efforts made by all civilians in order to overcome the air 
war. In line with the National Socialist notion of «Volksgemeinschaft» 
(«people’s community»), every «Aryan» German at the homefront was 
expected to help in reaching this aim in both mentally and physically 
active ways4.
Based on the above-mentioned reflections by Foucault, the present ar-
ticle focuses on the contemporaneous notion of «Selbstschutz» («self-
protection»), meaning the inclusion of civilians in resisting the expected 
air raids, as an essential part of civil air defense. «Selbstschutz», here, will 
be understood as an «apparatus of security» which, on the one hand, 
consists of an ensemble of organized practices, or techniques, used by 
the modern state in governing its population. On the other hand, this 
form of power, which has its target population, as its principal form of knowledge 
political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security» [Fou-
cault 1991, 102].
4 See the different contributions of military experts and Nationals Socialist politi-
cians in Knipfer, Hampe 1937.
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«apparatus of security» represents both mental and physical practices 
displayed by the civilians themselves. Both dimensions – which, as I 
argue, interact with and reproduce each other – are pervaded by po-
werful and highly ambivalent emotions, most notably, fear.
Focusing on the city of Bielefeld5 in East Westphalia, this article addres-
ses the following questions: firstly, what are the forms of fear and the 
resulting practices during the phase of training for «Selbstschutz» in the 
1930s and, subsequently, during the «real» situation of bombs falling in 
World War II? And, secondly, what were the specific ways, i.e. fun-
ctions and mechanisms used by the National Socialist regime to govern 
those fears and practices? In order to answer these questions, I begin 
by defining the historical concept of «Selbstschutz» before analyzing 
the concrete example of the «Luftschutzgemeinschaft» («community 
of air defense») as it was established in Bielefeld. Finally, I will give 
a brief conclusion and an outlook on «Selbstschutz» during the Cold 
War period.
Visions of ‘Self Protection’
Visions of a forthcoming war already existed since before the First 
World War, yet the first real – albeit limited – air bombings which oc-
curred during the war created a heightened level of anticipation [Süß 
2011, 31-37]. In Germany, these visions were closely connected to a 
militaristic and affirmative notion of war in right-wing political cir-
cles. Also, the construction of the first zeppelins sparked widespread 
German enthusiasm for aviation in general. This enthusiasm was lo-
aded with nationalist implications. Not only did people celebrate the 
«conquest of the air» by German aviation pioneers as a national awa-
5 Bielefeld became an «explicit target in battle planning» in the summer of 1941 
[Vogelsang 1994, 5].
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kening, but simultaneously, Germany’s geographic location became a 
problem in the face of a potential threat from above [Fritzsche 1991, 
201]. The First World War then delivered a first, indisputable proof 
of the destructive potential of airplanes armed with bombs. Now, the 
bombings – while remaining locally and technically limited – resulted 
in a spread of fear among the populations of cities such as London or 
Cologne [Süß 2011, 28-30].
The first concrete political reactions occurred during the Weimar ye-
ars. For instance, newly established lobby groups advocating civil air 
defense called attention to the new threat and demanded political ac-
tion in this domain. The aspect of civil air defense gained importance 
as an integral part of military expertise. At the same time, the focus 
on civic participation was constantly reinforced by emphasizing the 
need to overcome the air-war challenge as a «people’s community». 
The «Deutsche Luftschutzliga» («German Air Defence League») and 
similar militaristic organizations emerged with a nationalistic or even 
racial impetus as part of the right-wing politics against Weimar Repu-
blic [Lemke 2005, 98-166; Fritzsche 1991, 133-184].
«Selbstschutz» was the term used in reference to those aspects of civil air 
defense which required the participation of civilians. As an «apparatus 
of security», the concept increasingly became integrated into the agen-
da of the National Socialists after their takeover in 1933. It should be 
noted at this point that the National Socialist notion of the able-bodied 
and racially pure «Volksgemeinschaft» was not merely understood in 
a defensive way. The exclusionary aspect of this term was conceptua-
lized in close connection to the aggressive and expansionist notion of 
«Kampfgemeinschaft» («battle community») [Peukert 1982]. «Selbst-
schutz» denoted both the behavior and the practices to be carried out 
by every dutiful citizen before, during and after an air raid. After 1933, 
those practices were rehearsed in urban public spaces, and they played 
a prominent role in expert discourses and political communication.
In contrast to the intuitive semantics of «Selbstschutz», the term thus 
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referred to collective measures of protection. In that sense, the «people’s 
community» played a crucial role within the political field aimed at the 
production of «totality» [Steber, Gotto 2014]. Absolutely everybody 
who was not fighting as a soldier, «from children to old men», had to be 
able to react to bomb attacks in urban areas in a pragmatic and even he-
roic way, and needed fit into the «große System des Selbstschutzes, in 
diese Front der Kämpfer der Heimat [great system of self-protection, 
into the homefront of fighters, transl. the author]» [von Roques 1937, 
247]. Women were imagined not only as active participants, but even 
as leaders of the «Selbstschutzkräfte» («agents of self-protection»). This, 
of course, had little to do with feminist ideas of emancipation, but was 
due to the demographic fact that few men were left to fight at the home 
front during the war.
In terms of organizational structure, «Selbstschutz» was conceived 
along the lines of an organic model: from the «Luftschutzgemeinschaft» 
(«air raid home community») as the smallest unit to the «Luftschutzge-
meinschaft» of the city at large. The «Reichsluftschutzbund» (RLB) was 
founded immediately after the takeover as the single largest National 
Socialist organization6. It was responsible for educating the population 
on all issues related to aerial defense and coordinated the «Selbstschutz» 
up until the last months of war, before the NSDAP took control over 
this governmental field [Nolzen 2007].
The aim was to create a widespread «Luftschutzbereitschaft» («readiness 
for air defense»). To a general «airmindedness», which had existed in 
the German public sphere since imperial times, fascism added a new 
layer of enthusiasm for aviation and technology at large. From now 
on, civilians were to be trained to react to the constant risk of air war 
in terms of both mental and physical readiness to protect themselves 
6 At the beginning of the war, the RLB had 15 million members: Süß 2011, 45. 
The local group in Bielefeld had 23.271 members and 2.052 officials. See Westfälische 
Zeitung, Aufbau und Organisation, August 5, 1939.
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as a «people’s community»7. From the early 1930s on, thus even before 
the war, «Selbstschutz» practices began to pervade every aspect of daily 
life. Basements had to be transformed into impromptu bunker rooms. 
The potential «Selbstschutzkräfte» had to participate in training courses 
(which, ironically, were declared as «voluntary»), or they had the option 
of becoming official members of the «Reichsluftschutzbund», which 
trained, guided and exerted control over «Volksgenossen» («members 
of the people’s community») in all aspects related to «Selbstschutz». 
Through public mass exercises and rehearsals, bomb dummies, posters 
and special magazines, the anticipated air war slowly but steadily gai-
ned omnipresence in the urban public sphere.
Practices of ‘Self Protection’: A short local Case Study
The education of air defense forces towards «Luftschutzbereitschaft» 
already began in the early 1930s in the form of public exercises. They 
were staged in public squares or even across larger urban areas. As a 
consequence, air defense began to exert a significant influence on life 
in large German cities at an early stage of National Socialist rule. Public 
exercises were carried out as performances by more or less professio-
nalized air defense forces. They were mostly targeting bystanders as a 
random and spontaneous group of potential «Selbstschutzkräfte». Be-
sides the distribution of practical knowledge, an important aspect was 
the constant repetition of such (and similar) rituals. In doing so, the 
«Volksgenossen» were constantly reminded of the potential threat, and 
thus, sensitized and activated for actual cases of emergency.
7 Peter Fritzsches appropriate notion of «airmindedness» is defined as «the full-scale 
mobilization of the population according to the ideological principles of National So-
cialism under the pretext of adhering to supposedly self-evident military and techno-
logical requirements necessary for national survival in the air age» [Fritzsche 1991, 
190].
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In the spring of 1937, local newspapers reported on a spectacular ae-
rial defense exercise which had taken place on a square near the city 
hall the previous day. One of the numerous photographs illustrating 
the press coverage shows young members of the Hitler Youth at play. 
In the background, one can see a marching band of the same youth 
organization as well as numerous spectators. What makes this image 
particularly interesting is that the children – boys playing tug-of-war, 
girls engaging in a ball game – are equipped with gas masks, the so-
called «Volksgasmasken» or «VM 37»8. They were thus subject to a 
process of visual normatization, representing the «Kampfgemeinschaft» 
in a gruesome way. Beyond this representational function, however, 
the exercise also served a rather practical purpose of behavioral control. 
Bystanders were encouraged to purchase this particular, new model of 
gas mask, which was said to protect the «Selbstschutzkräfte», not only 
from actual gas attacks, but also from the smoke ascending from hou-
ses burning after an air raid. Besides the advertisement for a particular 
product, a further function of the exercise was to normalize both the air 
war itself and its dangers, to inscribe it into the daily life of all citizens 
including children. If even they were able to follow their daily routines 
while wearing gas masks, thus the subtext transmitted by the demon-
stration, adults should find it easy to do the same.
Nevertheless, the intention of such exercises was not to trivialize the 
danger and the issues at stake. In the aforementioned article, the image 
of playing children is followed by that of a demonstration of profes-
sional air defense forces, who were shown practicing real-life «Selbst-
schutz» situations such as fire extinction, in order to give the impression 
of security. Even in this case, however, the focus of interest was much 
more on the performative aspect of visibility and on the internalization 
of the danger lurking above than on the practical learning effect. The 
8 Since 1937, every single civilian should have been equipped with this professional 
protection mask, which was available in three sizes [Fritzsche 1991, 211].
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«danger from above» in general, and especially the militaristic and re-
vanchist politics of the National Socialist Regime, were meant to beco-
me normalized even in the sphere of urban daily life.
Blackouts in urban areas were another field of intense training and pre-
paration which pervaded daily life. According to Marc Wiggan’s com-
parative analysis of German and British aerial defense efforts, blackouts 
served two purposes, regardless of whether they occur before or during 
wartime. Firstly, they were meant as a physical defense: a totally dar-
kened city was thought to be invisible for enemy bombers. Secondly, 
they were meant to establish «a community spirit, or ethic, that would 
help their populations to survive a bombing war.» [Wiggan 2011, 43]
Focusing on Nazi Germany here, the alleged need for «totality» in the 
field of «Luftschutz-Selbstschutz» was allegorically repeated in regula-
tions for blacking out the city9. Even just one «Volksgenosse» disregar-
ding blackout regulations, thus the public discourse, would potential-
ly cause harm to an entire city. A lack in «Luftschutzbereitschaft», in 
that sense, also was an immediate offense causing harm for the entire 
«Volksgemeinschaft». Furthermore, in contrast to other security mea-
sures, blackouts could be monitored rather easily. It would seem safe 
to assume that blackout policies were enacted throughout and until the 
very end of the war because they provided a means of ensuring con-
stant mobilization among the population. This is particularly striking 
when considering the fact that blackouts were still carried out after 
they had become obsolete in the face of new ranging techniques.
This particular sub-field of «Selbstschutz» was exceptional in that it 
functioned via the conscious evocation of fear which, in turn, would 
9 Dietmar Süß provided the first systematic attempt of a comparative sociohistorical 
analysis of the societies of National Socialist Germany and liberal democratic Britain 
during air war. Regarding governmental strategies, both states created a community 
spirit in order to prepare their respective populations for air bombings. The National 
Socialist apparatus of society was not only a defensive governmental mechanism to 
control the people, but it was part of the concept of «Volksgemeinschaft» and part of 
both an exclusive racial politics and a militaristic imperial agenda [Süß 2011].
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lead to a certain type of security-oriented behavior. Apart from that, 
urban blackouts meant a step back into the pre-modern era not only 
in a symbolic sense. After all, street lighting at night had been a go-
vernmental strategy of warranting security in urban spaces. A darkened 
city is well known to provide a hunting ground for thieves and other 
criminals. This side-effect was countered by the National Socialist re-
gime by using all the ideological and repressive means it could muster, 
including death penalty for perpetrators10.
Seeking shelter in case of an alarm – the second most important duty of 
«Selbstschutzkräfte» next to obeying blackout regulations – remained 
an unsolved problem. The government staged aerial defense exercises 
with the purpose of training civilians for this case. Particularly daytime 
alarms would bring daily life to a complete halt: people in the streets 
and in their homes would have to abandon any activity and seek shelter 
in the nearest bunkers. Both the Reichsluftschutzbund and the NSDAP 
issued explicit orders prohibiting the breakout of mass panic in accor-
dance with the «Ruhe und Ordnung» doctrine11. However, in contrast 
to the «Luftschutzhausgemeinschaften», public shelters and bunkers 
brought together people of all kinds of social background. Here, the 
ideal of a homogeneous «Volksgemeinschaft» threatened to clash with 
reality. Already before and, more frequently, during the war, there 
were reports and complaints about wrongful and disrespectful beha-
vior in shelters12. In wartime, it was particularly bunkers which became 
10 Looters «prove themselves undeserving of being a part of the German pe-
ople’s community. Therefore, he shall be sentenced to death.» Bericht des Landge-
richtspräsidenten: Die Gerichtsbehörden in Bielefeld während des Krieges, in: Bielefelder 
Kriegschronik 1939/1940 (Teil 1), 169, Stadtarchiv Bielefeld 300,11, l. Nr. 1.
11 Newspapers played a crucial role in distributing knowledge on such matters. 
Generally speaking, air defense took up an increasing part of newspaper coverage 
in the 1930s. The focus was not only on informing the people; there was also de-
tailed coverage of exercises after the event. See, for instance, Bomben auf Bielefeld, 
«Westfälische Neueste Nachrichten», January 26, 1939.
12 See the report on the chaotic conditions in a public shelter: Schreiben Otto Stra-
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spaces of emotional response, particularly fear, and of National Socialist 
exclusion [Süß 2011; Buggeln, Marszolek 2008].
The provision of safe shelters in private homes was of growing im-
portance and, at the same time, became increasingly problematic. Due 
to scarcity in resources, it turned out to be impossible to provide safe 
shelters for the entire population. The «Luftschutzkeller» («bombing 
protection basement»), i.e. a remodeled basement room underneath a 
residential home or condominium, was the most important spatial ar-
rangement when it came to seeking shelter. The «Luftschutzhausge-
meinschaft» assembled in those spaces to wait for the end of an alarm or 
air raid. An exciting change in daily routines, the procedure of going 
downstairs under the guidance of the «Luftschutzhauswart» («air defen-
se supervisor») quickly turned into an inconvenient chore. Particularly 
during the first months of war, and during the years of 1940-1941, the 
residents of Bielefeld spent a great amount of time in their respective 
shelter basements without bombs actually falling. The resulting reac-
tions oscillated between fear, dullness and indifference. Many civilians 
began to disobey the order of going downstairs in case of an alarm.
Active «Selbstschutzkräfte», who would be the ones fighting against 
the «Brandbombe» («fire bomb») during actual air raids, were theore-
tically and practically trained in so-called «Luftschutzschulen» («aerial 
defense schools»), where they also had to become physically active. In-
terestingly, these training sessions were structured in such a way that, 
«psychologically speaking», exercises were just risky enough so as not 
to cause any physical harm or induce generalized fear or panic. Para-
doxically enough, the reality of war was not to become all too real. To 
illustrate this paradox, consider the following example: a widely publi-
cized field report recounts an exercise during which a group of overly 
enthusiastic RLB members were crawling through a barb-wire tunnel 
etmanns an Betriebsluftschutzleiter Petri vom 1.11.1943, in Stadtarchiv Bielefeld 108,7/
Hochbauamt, l. Nr. 240.
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while wearing gas masks. Although the exercise in itself was relatively 
dangerous, their supervisor reportedly used tear gas to make the exer-
cise even more «realistic», thereby exposing the trainees to an even 
higher level of risk. Similarly, there are several reports indicating that 
participants in «Selbstschutz» rehearsals were repeatedly injured by fake 
or even real fire bombs. The Reichsluftfahrtministerium («Ministry of 
Aviation») eventually prohibited such brutal practices on the local level 
because they would deter «Volksgenossen» from participating in air 
defense altogether. The paradoxical nature of this assessment on the 
part of the government exemplifies the ambivalent nature of fear. After 
all, exercises using the now-forbidden fire bombs did come rather close 
to the reality of an air war which would begin very soon. The main-
tenance of security, and thus, «Luftschutzbereitschaft» in the present 
was thus deemed more important than security in a projected future 
scenario. «Selbstschutz» had become stabilized as a risk-free security 
apparatus following its own internal logic. This intrinsically paradoxi-
cal system was doomed to fail with the beginning of British air attacks 
against the «German Reich».
Fear and security are thus always inscribed in concrete temporal ima-
ginaries. Between the wars, air war was conceptualized within the fra-
mework of a complex, unstable and unpredictable set of expectations. 
«Selbstschutz», with its simulation games and exercises, thus created a 
certain level of experience among the population. Although this expe-
rience was based on expertise generated from the aforementioned ex-
pectations, the reality of bombings was very different from theoretical 
musings and also from the practical simulation exercises13.
This was exactly what happened in Bielefeld after 1941. The «Selb-
13 The air war, fear and «Selbstschutz» are all embedded in imaginaries of time, 
between the «horizon of expectations» and the mostly simulated «space of experience» 
[Koselleck 2004].
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stschutzkräfte» had to prove themselves under real-life conditions14. 
From then on, the fear of suffering physical harm or of losing one’s 
livelihood was based on material, physically tangible dangers and expe-
riences and could no longer be avoided through governmental means 
of risk minimization or through the simple act of non-participation in 
«Selbstschutz» exercises. When people began to realize that they were 
facing a life-or-death struggle, this was the first time that widespread 
fear became an actual problem for the NS security administration. The 
«Selbstschutzkräfte» now had to be directed in such a way that they 
were willing to face danger at the risk of losing their lives so as to pre-
vent even greater damage to the urban «Luftschutzgemeinschaft».
With the onset of British air raids, the most important arena of «Selb-
stschutz» was the fight against fire bombs, a problem which created 
massive fear among «Selbstschutzkräfte» until the very end of the war. 
Already during an ongoing attack, active «Selbstschutzkräfte» were to 
observe the events from their respective basement under the guidance 
of their supervisor in order to become active in case their own hou-
se was hit by a bomb. The first fire bombs were built in such a way 
that they would fall through the roof and further floors of a residential 
home before setting fire to furniture and other flammable materials 
over the course of several minutes.
In such cases, the «Selbstschutzkräfte» had to use the most simple tools 
– home-made devices such as sand-filled buckets, the so-called «Feuer-
patsche» («fire beater») and the «Luftschutzhandspritze» («air defense 
nozzle») – to extinguish the surrounding fires before turning to the 
burning bomb itself. This meant crawling towards the bomb, all the 
while wearing provisional protection gear and, ideally, the «Volksga-
smaske»; extinguishing the bomb with sand; or even carrying it out-
14 In sparsely or unpopulated areas of the city, such as Gadderbaum, «Selbstschutz» 
was carried out in its pre-war form until 1944. See Einsatzübungen der Selbstschut-
zkräfte im August 1944, Stadtarchiv Bielefeld 130,9/Gemeinde Gadderbaum, l. Nr. 
2497.
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side. Needless to say, this procedure was highly dangerous and poten-
tially lethal – especially considering the fact that fighter jets ejected 
exploding bombs along with fire bombs in order to cause even greater 
damage and to deter the «Selbstschutzkräfte».
Sources confirm that fears were pervasive; for instance, newspapers, 
placards as well as Reichsluftschutzbund and NSDAP events repeatedly 
stressed the importance of showing courage when dealing with the 
bomb. This was achieved by construing the bomb as virtually harmless 
– all one had to do in order to dismantle the threat from above, thus the 
public discourse, was to approach it in a head-on manner. Even thou-
gh daily newspapers simultaneously evoked well-crafted narratives of 
heroic behavior15, it is safe to say that there was an overall tendency of 
using what the sociologist Wolfgang Bonß has aptly called «Abkür-
zungsstrategien» («strategies of abbreviation»), which are characteristic 
of modern security politics in general [Bonß 1997]. These strategies 
are used in this context to overcome the challenges of a complex social 
reality and especially the dangers and insecurities of modern techno-
logy. Modern warfare and the air war meant a massive threat to the 
specific German fixation on security.
As long as there were only few bomb impacts in Bielefeld, the «Selbst-
schutz» remained functional with the help of such governmental stra-
tegies, even though remaining fears still needed to be dealt with. In 
the event of larger attacks, which combined fire and exploding bombs, 
this was no longer possible. «Selbstschutzkräfte» were fearing for their 
lives in such a way that they would not leave their shelters and bun-
kers, which meant that they did not extinguish fires or dismantle the 
bombs. The disappointment expressed by the mayor of Stuttgart, «[d]
er Selbstschutz hat versagt [Selbstschutz has failed]», is certainly true for 
15 See, for example, the report of an 8o-year-old invalid who allegedly defused 
three bombs, one of them by rolling it into a carpet and carrying it out of the house 
with his bare hands. See Zwei alte Schildescher bewährten sich bei der Bekämpfung von 
Brandbomben, «Westfälische Zeitung», October 19, 1940.
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Bielefeld as well [quoted in Kramer 2011, 157].
As a consequence, «Selbstschutz» was restructured across the «Reich». 
From 1942 on mobile units were responsible for several houses at once, 
and their members generally had a higher level of experience and pro-
fessional know-how [Beer 1990, 28]. At the same time, the narrative 
strategy of public discourse moved away from its former, idealized way 
of describing the fight against the bomb as an heroic act. Instead, the 
shelter basement increasingly became the central spatial arrangement 
framing the practices of «Selbstschutz». Particularly since individuals 
were frequently trapped in shelters due to the density of the attacks 
and the increasing weight of individual bombs, fear came to be almost 
entirely confined to those close quarters. The shelter had lost its status 
as a safe harbor and space of heroic resistance.
The agenda of aerial defense was adapted accordingly, and «Volksge-
nossen» – who were thereafter addressed as individuals – received advi-
ce for «Selbsthilfe» («self-help»). This included, among other things, tips 
on breaking through walls and escaping from basement rooms which 
all too often turned into life-threatening furnaces. «Selbstschutz», in-
cluding its earlier heroic depiction of serving the community, began to 
vanish from public discourse. Instead, perseverance and the ability to 
escape from shelters gained more and more importance16. At the same 
time, the NSDAP, which took over a great deal of tasks related to air 
defense from the RLB, began to organize paternalistic care of those who 
had been bombed out. Here, we can observe a structural change from a 
focus on preventive measures and a crucial position of the population as 
an actor in aerial defense towards concrete, material help for bombed-
out people through public administrative bodies [Süß 2011, 226-237]. 
The task of fire extinction was conferred to more or less professional 
16 See Phosphor. Deine Selbsthilfe im Bombenkrieg, «Westfälische Neueste Na-
chrichten», August 7, 1943. Here, the Volksgenossen were addressed directly: «It sure 
takes a lot of courage to help yourself in the bomb war – but you’ve got that courage, 
don’t you?»
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security forces. Women, who had worked as «Luftschutzhauswartin-
nen» and fighters in «Selbstschutz», had been removed from leading 
positions in the «Luftschutzhausgemeinschaften» since the beginning 
of the war [Kramer 2011, 118-124]. Once more, they were reimagined 
as being overly emotional in the sense of hysteria and fear. «Psycholo-
gical reasons» were given to justify the fact that men were once again 
assigned leading positions in aerial defense. The role of women was 
limited to emergency relief and care work inside the shelters and after 
bomb attacks17.
In the midst of the ongoing air war, Bielefeld experienced a paradox 
which bears interesting implications for the history of security and 
emotions. As the rather quiet year of 1942 progressed, there was a 
significant decrease in «Luftschutzbereitschaft» and, along with that, 
in collective fear, which led to even the most fundamental aspects of 
«Luftschutz-Selbstschutz» being neglected. Despite repeated alarms, 
people no longer took to the bunkers and shelters, but instead – as one 
exemplary source indicates – continued to watch a theater performan-
ce18.
The temporary, and certainly paradoxical disappearance of fear can be 
grasped with the help of Niklas Luhmann’s notion of «expectational 
security» [Luhmann 1995, 303-307]. Along those lines, Bielefeld’s po-
pulation was experiencing a typical pattern of coping with insecurity: 
the danger, which was no longer perceived as manifest yet still exi-
sting, was blanked out, which resulted in the neglect of practices which 
had previously been carried out in order to ensure security among the 
«Volksgemeinschaft». The result, in Luhmannian terms, was a reduc-
tion of complexity in the face of future insecurity [Bonß 1997, 24f.].
17 Schreiben des RMdL an das Präsidium des RLB vom 30.9.1940, Stadtarchiv Biele-
feld 130,9/Gemeinde Gadderbaum, l. Nr. 2492.
18 Stadttheater Bielefeld – Rückblick auf die 5. Kriegs-Spielzeit 1943/44, Stadtarchiv 
Bielefeld 300,11, l. Nr. 8, Kriegschronik 1944, 238.
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When the air war returned to Bielefeld with two massive bombings in 
January and September of 1944, the collective strategy of coping with 
fear had changed once more. This time, the discourse was centered 
around the idea of a transcendent fate, according to which a morally 
superior «Volksgemeinschaft» could no longer put up a fight against 
the brutal acts of crime committed by the allied «Luftgangster» («air 
gangsters»)19. The «Volksgenossen» were told to simply remain per-
severant – after all, the deaths of others should not have been in vain. 
The «Endsieg» («final victory»), as vague and indeterminate as it re-
mained, was at the heart of a narrative of deliverance and resurrection 
awaiting those who were able to hold out for a better future. The fear 
of the «Selbstschutzkräfte» was no longer the target of governmental 
strategies; the security apparatus had collapsed along with the overall 
governmental regime of emotional control20.
Conclusion and outlook
Individual and, even more importantly, collective emotions were a 
crucial object of governmental practices in the era of National Socia-
lism. Air war and the need to cope with this new form of warfare on 
the level of the entire society became problematized and publicized. 
Along with the emergence of a body of prognostic knowledge regar-
ding these new techniques of warfare, «Selbstschutz» in the context of 
civil air defense developed as a security apparatus of National Socialism. 
In everyday urban life, this apparatus urged citizens to acknowledge 
the fact that they were in danger, and to share and distribute practical 
19 The most popular book on the air war in Germany is still Jörg Friedrich’s, where 
he has articulated this long-lived narrative of victimization: Friedrich 2006.
20 See the report on a mass funeral after a massive attack: Sie starben nicht umsonst, 
«Westfälische Zeitung», January 18, 1944.
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knowledge. Furthermore, they were trained to follow strict practical 
routines, under the assumption that this would keep fear in check or 
even channel such emotions into productive driving forces. Yet even 
beyond the aspect of maintaining security, «Selbstschutz» ultimately ai-
med at activating the «people’s community» for the purpose of waging 
a war of conquest and extermination.
In contrast to, for instance, the development in Great Britain, the Ger-
man case was underwritten by an imagination of a coming war as a 
potentially positive force which would recreate society or community. 
Great Britain did adopt measures of civil air defense to define and or-
ganize the duties of civil society in this context. However, what was 
certainly missing in liberal democratic societies was an equivalent to 
«Selbstschutz». The National Socialist apparatus of security had the 
function of creating the «Volksgemeinschaft» within the smaller units 
of urban communities of aerial defense through daily routines. The 
idea of a «total», heroic and soldierly fight at the «homefront», even in 
peacetime, was a specifically National Socialist phenomenon. Moreo-
ver, German «Selbstschutz» is different from the British notion of the 
«people’s war» in its exclusionary dimension.
«Selbstschutz» thus emerged between the wars as a field of politics 
and actions of securitization which followed its own internal logic of 
predictions and which became increasingly self-sustaining. However, 
when the predicted future became a reality in the sense of actual war 
and bombs falling on German cities, this elaborate system of training 
and preparation failed.
Nevertheless, the fight against and governance of fear did not take on 
forms of total control, constraint or mere propaganda at any point in 
time during the «Third Reich». Instead, we can observe rather subtle 
forms of behavioral control aimed at nipping fear in the bud, which 
was perceived as necessary in order to keep citizens from turning away 
from the issue of air defense. Furthermore, techniques of governance 
were malleable and adjusted according to the changing circumstances. 
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The idealized, amateur «Selbstschutz» of the pre-war era was restructu-
red and professionalized once air war had become a reality with which 
aerial defense communities had to cope. The dispositive became de-
stabilized in the face of the sheer masses of people who had lost their 
homes as a result of air raids. In the situation of massive aerial bom-
bings, the last in a series of adaptations – resulting in the disappearance 
of «Selbstschutz» – can be described as an increasingly transcendent 
construction of the Germans as victims of war crimes. This myth of 
victimization, which was first established by Joseph Goebbels, survived 
the war and was particularly powerful during the early years of the Fe-
deral Republic, when the air war was preserved in collective memory 
as having demonstrated the great capacity of the «Volksgemeinschaft» 
to cope with losses and suffering.
While «Selbstschutz» in its original form was abandoned after 1945, the 
term gained renewed importance during the Cold War period. Within 
the context of governmental and municipal structures of security poli-
tics in case of war and catastrophe, it now included citizens’ individual 
practices of self-protection. For instance, campaigns of Civil Defense 
in the 1960s addressed those individual actions which were necessary to 
survive a nearby nuclear strike. However, the cultural implications of 
National Socialist «Selbstschutz» no longer existed. It was neither sha-
ped by militaristic or heroic images, nor was it a mechanism of social 
exclusion anymore. Of course, governmental techniques during the 
«post-heroic age» (Herfried Münkler) were still targeting fears on both 
the individual and the societal level. However, it should be noted that 
the security apparatus was no longer used to justify any kind of mili-
taristic education of civil society in times of peace, but that it was only 
reactivated in cases of emergency. Eventually, fear would come to be 
articulated not only in scenarios of a looming war, but also in the sense 
of a distinctly political concept, as can be observed for the context of the 
emerging peace and anti-nuclear movements.
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